00-22-19

April 15,1976

Becret Eyes Only To: Bill Rogers

Subject: USG - Chile Relations

I'm writing at Bill Luers' suggestion. A member of Santiago Embassy Political Section is here (until c.o.b. Friday) for reassignment to the field, after being in Chile since August, 1973. We've talked candidly off the record. His report on Embassy relations with the Junta is most disturbing. He says:

1. The Junta does not get clear signals on USG's Chile policy. They note our votes in OAS and U.N., read your speeches, etc., but also see us pushing the Hill hard on behalf of help for ^Chile, The USG Executive branch comes through as pro-Junta, trying to deal with the Hill and public opinion in the Junta's interests. 3000 2. CIA and DOD are strongly pro-Junta. ^During one conversation with a high GOC official a U.S. Embassy ^Colonel referred to

"that Communist Kennedy".

3. The Ambassador's position, supported by Stout, DOD ______, is 3.3(b)(1) a minority one. The majority of the Country Team accept the utility of sanctions to move the Junta more quickly toward a position acceptable to ^Chilean domestic opinion and reasonable international critics. The attached CASP major issue papers, just submitted, reflect the two views.

4. There is no viable alternative to the Junta. It would be a political disaster if it fell. Pinochet can be influenced, if reached. But clear signals are essential.

SANITIZED E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5 NLJ<u>/4/S 06-27</u> Bychm_, NARA, Date 12-11-06

Comment:

Several years ago I talked at length with a DCM from the field and the then Assistant Secretary about changing USG policy towards one Latin American government. The Assistant Secretary suggested instructing the Ambassador to go to the Foreign Minister with a clear message. The DCM estimated that would be useless unless the Military Attache carried the identical message to their counterparts.

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G. Lister